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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-2265
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BENJAMIN SMITH,
                               Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 02-cr-0030)
District Court: Hon. Stewart Dalzell
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 25, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, McKEE and CHERTOFF,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 10, 2004)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Benjamin Smith appeals the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
On September 7, 2001, Philadelphia Police Officers Jerold Seiple and Nate Smith
2were riding in a marked patrol car in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania when, around 2 a.m.,
they saw a green Lexus operating without its headlights.   After a radio check confirmed
that the car’s license plate had expired they pulled the Lexus over near the intersection of
4th Street and Lehigh Avenue.
Officer Seiple approached the driver’s side of the Lexus and asked Smith, who
was in the driver’s seat, for his license and registration.  Smith replied that he only had an
ID card and then reached into his left pocket with his left hand as he reached over toward
the glove box.  As he reached, Officer Seiple saw the butt of a handgun protruding from
Smith’s waistband, and he asked Smith if he had any weapons in the car.  Smith denied
that he did and Seiple asked Smith to get out of the car.  Smith responded by kicking the
door open and climbing between the door and the door frame.  Seiple then grabbed
Smith by his sweatshirt and Smith and Seiple fell backward.  A struggle then ensued
between Officer Seiple, Officer Smith, and defendant Smith.  During that struggle, the
defendant pointed the gun at the police officers, but they were eventually able to knock
the gun away.  Officer Smith then threw the weapon on top of the police car and out of
the defendant’s reach.  At some point during the struggle, the defendant stated that he
was not going back to jail. 
Smith was ultimately subdued and arrested, and the police seized the gun.
Subsequent investigation disclosed that it was an operable Smith & Wesson .9mm, semi-
automatic pistol with an obliterated serial number and that it contained six rounds.  
3II.
   A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Smith with one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  § 922(g)(1).  The
indictment also contained a notice of forfeiture for the Smith & Wesson .9mm semi-
automatic pistol and the ammunition.
On June 14, 2002, the Federal Defender’s Association was appointed to represent
Smith.  At Smith’s request, his trial was then continued until September 30, 2002.  On
July 31, 2002, Smith filed a pro se motion to suppress evidence. On August 1, 2002, he
filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
based upon a theory that Congress lacked the authority to enact the felon in possession
statute.  The district court relied on United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.
2001), in dismissing that motion.
On August 9, 2002, Smith filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on the
Second Amendment.   On September 4, 2002, he filed another pro se motion to dismiss
the indictment and the next day he filed a pro se addendum to his pro se motion to
dismiss.  He thereafter filed an amended pro se motion to dismiss.   The district court
denied these motions by order dated September 20, 2002.  His earlier suppression motion
was denied following an evidentiary hearing, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the testimony of ATF  Special Agent James Juvena was admitted without
objection.  He testified that the gun had been manufactured in Massachusetts, and that
1 The district court ordered the letter and affidavit docketed as a motion for a new
trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33.
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parts had been manufactured in Maine and Minnesota. The parties also stipulated that
Smith had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.
On the first day of trial, September 30, 2002, the district court re-opened the
suppression motion and permitted Smith to personally argue another pro se motion, i.e.,
that the stop of his car violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
At the conclusion of the first day of trial, the district court denied that motion, the trial
continued, and the jury convicted Smith. 
On October 3, 2002, Smith sent a letter and accompanying affidavit to the district
court, alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for denying him the right to
testify.1   On October 8, 2002, Smith filed a  pro se motion for withdrawal of trial
counsel. The court granted that motion on October 12, 2002, and appointed new counsel
for Smith.  On November 27, 2002, Smith filed a pro se motion for judgment of acquittal
and new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, 33 and 34, in which he repeated his claim of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
On April 15, 2003, the district court held a hearing to address all outstanding
motions.  The witnesses included Defender Association attorneys Kenneth Edelin and
Leigh Skipper, and the defendant’s mother, Sheketter Smith.  Thereafter, the court
5denied all of the outstanding motions and Smith was subsequently sentenced to 120
months incarceration plus a term of supervised release, a special assessment and a fine. 
Smith filed a timely appeal.  However, on April 29, 2003, he filed a pro se motion for
reduction of sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b).  The district court caused this motion
to be docketed under Rule 35(a), as a motion for correction of sentence caused by error,
and thereafter denied it.  
III.
Smith’s appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he is unable to identify any non-frivolous issue for review. 
An appointed appellate counsel who “finds [a] case to be wholly frivolous, after a
conscientious examination of” the case, must so advise the court of appeals and request
permission to withdraw.  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (1967).  Counsel’s request must be
accompanied by a “brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support
the appeal.”  Id.  The brief must identify any “issue arguably supporting the appeal even
though the appeal was wholly frivolous,” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000),
“explain why the issues are frivolous,” United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 781 (3d
Cir. 2000), and show that counsel “thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable
issues.”  Id. at 780; see also United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
Counsel’s Anders brief refers us to the portions of the record that arguably present
non-frivolous issues and he identifies the following issues: the credibility of trial
2We exercise plenary review over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a
clearly erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings.  United States v. Cepero, 224
F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.  However, Smith’s counsel has
concluded that any claim of error would be frivolous and we agree for the reasons
explained in the Anders brief.
Smith has also filed a pro se brief raising the following issues: (1) ineffectiveness
of trial counsel; (2) the validity of the traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) an alleged Brady violation;
(4) erroneous jury instructions; and (5) a due process challenge to § 922(g).  We will
address each argument below.
A.  Ineffectiveness of trial counsel.2
As noted, the day after his conviction, Smith wrote a letter to the district court
alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective because they would not let him or his
brother testify at trial.  He subsequently filed a pro se § 2255 motion reiterating his claim
of ineffectiveness, and moved for a new trial under Rules 29, 33 and 34.  The district
court appointed new counsel and held an evidentiary hearing before denying the post-
trial claims.   Smith challenges that ruling on appeal. 
Smith’s trial counsel, Federal Defenders Leigh Skipper and Kenneth Edelin,
testified that although Smith initially said that he wanted to testify, they strongly advised
against it, since Smith would thereby open himself up to damaging impeachment based
7on his two prior robbery convictions.  Trial counsel believed it more prudent to impugn
the credibility of the police officers rather than advise Smith to take the stand.  The trial
transcript reflects counsels’ attempts to aggressively impeach the officers’ testimony and
to exploit alleged discrepancies between their testimony and their reports.
Defense counsel also presented evidence to suggest that the police officers
assaulted Smith in the hospital after his arrest.  This included testimony from a Temple
University emergency room physician, Dr. Schwell, regarding contusions on Smith’s
forehead, lip and back following the arrest.  The physician also testified that Smith had
reported being assaulted by police while in the hospital and that an officer came into the
emergency room and hit Smith in the mouth.
Counsel also testified that, prior to trial, Smith claimed that his brother (“Andre”)
could testify that he had loaned Smith his car.   Smith had told counsel that the police
took the gun from the trunk of the car.  Counsel interviewed André on the Friday before
trial but concluded that Andre would not be helpful.   Although they thought him
credible, he was reluctant to testify. He confirmed that he had loaned the car to Smith,
but claimed to know nothing about any gun in the trunk. 
On the Monday morning of trial, André sought out counsel and told them that he
loved his brother and that he wanted to testify.  However, André was concerned about
getting into trouble and told counsel he was not going to lie.  He then showed counsel a
letter from the defendant in which the defendant had asked André to say that he loaned
3 Edelin’s recollection is consistent with Skipper’s. Both counsel believed that
Smith acquiesced after consulting with his mother. 
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the car to someone else before he loaned it to Smith.  Attorney Skipper specifically
recalled the portion of the letter that said “tell them – someone whose name I forgot –
had the car.  They’ll never find him because he’s dead.”    Defense counsel and André
both interpreted this as an attempt to suborn perjury and counsel responded by telling
André that he would not be called as a witness. Counsel also told Smith that they would
have to ask the court to remove them if he decided to testify because they refused to
assist his perjury. Smith did not testify.
At the conclusion of the government’s case, the court granted a recess for counsel
to confer with Smith.  Counsel once again told Smith that he had a right to testify, but
they recommended against it.   Counsel testified that Smith was dissatisfied with counsel
and wanted his mother’s advice.  Skipper then conferred with Mrs. Smith.  He told her
that he and Edelin recommended against Smith testifying.  When Smith made an inquiry
of his mother about testifying, Mrs. Smith shook her head “no” and told Skipper that she
also believed that Smith should not testify.3  Smith testified during the post-trial
hearings that when he first met Edelin and told him that he wanted to testify at trial,
Edelin had no response whatsoever.  Smith claimed that neither of his attorneys ever told
him that he had the right to testify.  He admitted, however, that counsel believed he
should not testify because of potentially damaging revelations concerning his prior
9convictions. Yet, according to Smith, during discussions of trial strategy, when he told
both counsel that he wanted to testify and that he was serious about it, both counsel
started laughing and joking.  Accordingly to Smith, his brother was prepared to testify
that the firearm was in the trunk of the car which André had loaned to him.  Smith claims
that counsel never explained why they would not call André as a witness other than
Skipper saying that his trial experience led him to believe that the jury had a doubt.  Not
surprisingly, André Smith did not testify during the post-trial hearing on the defendant’s
ineffectiveness claim.
The district court accepted the testimony of Skipper and Edelin and rejected
Smith’s testimony about his decision not to testify.  Nothing on this record suggests that
the court’s credibility determination was clearly erroneous.    In fact, Smith’s claim that
counsel refused to comply with his decision to testify is belied by the record.  In the letter
he wrote to the district court the day after his conviction complaining about his counsel’s
ineffectiveness, Smith wrote that he told his lawyers that he would not testify if his
mother told him not to. He also wrote that “my mother told me don’t testify and I listened
even though I wanted to testify.”  Supp. App. 356. 
Smith’s post-trial testimony also shows that he voluntarily relinquished his right to
testify.  Smith admitted that he told counsel that the only person who could tell him not
to testify was his mother.  When he saw his mother shake her head “no” while speaking
to Skipper, he thought that she did not want him to testify.  He then explained,  “[s]o, I
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didn’t testify.”  Supp. App. 275.  Under these circumstances, the district court properly
accepted the defense attorneys’ reasonable belief that Smith had assented to their
recommendation that he not testify. The district court also correctly noted that counsel
acted ethically in advising Smith that they would move to withdraw if Smith decided to
testify.  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986). We will not now allow Smith to spin
counsel’s ethical conduct into a claim of ineffectiveness.
Smith also claims that counsel was ineffective for not calling a hospital triage
nurse to testify.  He claims that she would have testified about injuries he had when
admitted to the hospital following his arrest.  Purportedly, she would have testified that
some of the injuries noted in hospital records resulted from the arresting officers
punching Smith in the hospital.   In his view, had this information been provided to the
jury, the police officers’ credibility would have been undermined since they testified that
they went to the hospital only to identify Smith.  
However, the nurse’s purported testimony would have been cumulative in light of
Dr. Schwell’s testimony.  Schwell’s testimony raised a question about the officers’
credibility and we can not, therefore, conclude that defense counsel were ineffective in
failing to call another witness to testify about the same thing.  
Smith also claims that counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the jury
instruction concerning constructive possession of a firearm.  In order to prevail on this
claim, Smith must show that counsel’s failure to object to this instruction was an error
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“so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment,” and he must also show that his counsel’s deficient performance resulted in
prejudice.  The Supreme Court has defined prejudice as a “reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
The district court’s charge was taken directly from Sand’s Modern Federal Jury
Instructions, and counsel’s failure to object to a standard jury charge can hardly be
viewed as so inept as to fall outside “the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Supp. App. 388.  Moreover, Smith cannot show
prejudice because the district court also instructed on actual possession.  The jury
obviously accepted the police officers’ version of what happened, and their testimony
establishes actual possession.
Finally, Smith claims that counsel erred in not properly articulating a theory of
cross-examination and thereby depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses against him.  At trial, defense counsel attempted to question Officer Seiple on
his knowledge of police directives concerning the use of deadly force, but the
government objected.  At a sidebar, counsel said that he wanted to bring out that, if the
police really believed they were threatened when Smith pointed his weapon at them, they
would have been justified in shooting him. The district court found that the line of
questioning was unnecessarily confusing since there was no shooting and it precluded
4We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to
the underlying factual findings but we exercise plenary review of the district court’s
application of the law to those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir.
2002). 
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further questioning.   
Smith claims that counsel was ineffective because they did not argue that the
testimony showed bias.   However, Smith’s defense was that the police officers’ version
of the incident was not credible, not that the police were biased.  Smith’s Sixth
Amendment challenge to his attorneys’ stewardship is utterly frivolous.
B.  Traffic stop.4
Smith reiterates his suppression motion argument that the traffic stop violated the
Fourth Amendment because the police officers never wrote citations for traffic
violations.  He also claims that the stop violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the stop was racially motivated.   Smith is an African-
American male.  He argues that the arresting police officer testified that factors such as
the defendant’s race, the price of his automobile and the neighborhood in which he
traveled were all factors in the officer’s decision to stop the car.  Not surprisingly, Smith
provides no record citation for those allegations.
During cross-examination, Officer Smith did agree with defense counsel’s
characterization that the Lexus Smith was driving was a “high-end” car; it was.  Defense
counsel also elicited testimony that the police recognized the gender and race of the
5The officers’ 48s did contain statements that the car was being driven with an
expired tag.
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driver of the car before it was stopped.  Counsel brought out that Smith was not ticketed
for the expired tag or failure to use his headlights, both of which are violations of the
traffic code. 
Nevertheless, the testimony at the suppression supported the court’s finding that
the police officers stopped the car only because they were suspicious of a car being
driven at 2 a.m. in a high-crime area without headlights and with an expired registration. 
Officer Smith testified that he had been patrolling the area for about six years, and that he
knew it to be a high-crime area, with numerous shootings, robberies and drug-related
crimes.  During cross-examination, Office Seiple reiterated that his attention was drawn
to the Lexus only because the headlights were out, and that the car was stopped only after
the police learned that the registration had expired.  
Officer Seiple admitted that neither his nor Officer Smith’s police “48,” contained
a statement about the Lexus being driven without headlights.5  However, Officer Seiple’s
investigation interview memorandum, a more detailed handwritten account of the
incident prepared shortly after the 48, did note that the Lexus had an expired tag and no
headlights.   In addition, Officer Smith’s memorandum, prepared the same day,
confirmed that he stopped the defendant because the car was operating without
headlights at 2:00 a.m. and the radio check disclosed an expired registration. 
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Accordingly, the district court correctly found that the officers had the authority to stop
Smith’s car.  United States v. Moorefield, 11 F.3d 10, 12 (3d Cir. 1997).
Moreover, the absence of traffic citations does not impair the validity of the traffic
stop.  The officers apparently thought the fact that Smith pointed a gun at them and
announced that he wasn’t going back to prison was a bit more weighty than the fact that
the car he was driving also had an expired registration and no headlights. Accordingly,
Smith’s argument is simply not compelling.
The district court believed that Smith had committed a traffic infraction and that
he was legally stopped because of it.  Once the police stopped Smith and saw the gun,
they were clearly justified in arresting him and seizing the weapon after the ensuing
scuffle.
At the hearing the district court allowed Smith to make a lengthy argument in
support of his Equal Protection Claim.   Smith argued that he was stopped because he
was a Black man driving a Lexus in a high-crime area.  The district court rejected that
argument based upon the credible testimony regarding the traffic violations, and nothing
in Smith’s pro se brief convinces us the district court erred.  
C.  Failure to disclose Brady material.
Smith argues that the government violated the disclosure requirements of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) because it “ambushed him with Brady material.”  Smith’s
Br. at 23.  He refers to Government Exhibit 3, a computerized record of calls to the
6Because there was no objection to the admission of the radio log, we review for
plain error.  United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 174 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002).  It is Smith’s
burden to establish plain error.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993).  To
do so, he must prove: (1) that the court erred; (2) the error was obvious under the law at
the time of review; and (3) the error affected substantial rights, that is, the error affected
the outcome of the trial.  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997).  If all three
elements are established, the reviewing court may exercise its discretion to afford relief. 
That discretion should be exercised only in cases where the defendant is “actually
innocent” or the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citation omitted).  The “plain-error
exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is to be used sparingly, solely in those
circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”  United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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Philadelphia Police radio room, which was introduced into evidence by the government
without objection from defense counsel.6   Smith claims that counsel was unfamiliar with
the radio log and could not properly confront the government’s “timeline.”  Id.  
The government introduced the radio log to frame the time of the events.  The log
noted that the traffic stop was at 1:53 a.m., the call was changed to officer assist within
the minute and, at 1:54 a.m., the log notes “male apprehended.”   Thus, the log shows
that the entire episode after the car stop took approximately one minute.  Smith argues
that, since Officer Seiple’s investigative report notes that the struggle took two to three
minutes, a serious contradiction exists between the radio log and Officer Seiple’s
testimony.  
The government claims that the radio log was given to the defense, but it does not
say when.  In any event, assuming arguendo that the radio log was not properly turned
over, we still fail to see how Smith’s defense was prejudiced.   The radio log does not
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amount to impeachment.  At best, it suggests that the officers simply thought that the
struggle took two minutes longer than it actually did. Since they were wrestling with an
armed suspect who had pointed a gun at them and proclaimed he wasn’t going back to
jail, it is not hard to conclude that their measure of time was a bit less accurate than that
of a finally tuned stop watch.
The police testified that Smith was taken from the scene by a police transport van
and taken to the hospital for treatment.  The arresting officers went to the hospital to get
Smith’s name and ID card, then arrived at the police station at approximately 2:42 a.m. 
This time is confirmed by the radio log.   Officer Seiple testified that he and Officer
Smith first completed their 48s, approximately 10 to 15 minutes later.  
Smith contends that the hospital records, introduced as a defense exhibit, show
that he did not arrive at the hospital until 2:43 a.m., one minute after the police say that
had returned to East Detectives.  In Smith’s view, this demonstrates the impossibility of
the officers’ testimony.  However, Smith has ignored the testimony of his own witness,
Dr. Schwell, the hospital emergency room physician, who testified that he treated Smith
at approximately 2:15 a.m.   Therefore, the uncontradicted testimony shows that Smith
was taken from the scene after 1:54.  He was taken to the hospital where he was treated
in the emergency room at 2:15 a.m., and thereafter; the police went to the hospital to get
Smith’s identification and returned to East Detectives at approximately 2:42 a.m. to
begin their reports.   We therefore fail to see any Brady impeachment material in the
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radio logs.
Smith also claims that the radio log confirms his contention that the police
stopped him, then searched the trunk of the car where they found the gun.  He contends
that was done during the “unaccounted for” time between 1:49 a.m., when the first radio
call was made by the police, and 1:53 a.m. when they stopped his car. That argument
ignores the undisputed testimony that after 1:49 a.m., when the police were informed that
the registration had expired, they made a U-turn, pulled behind Smith and stopped his car
at approximately 1:53 a.m.   There is no impeachment material in the radio log as to this
issue either.
In short, there was no Brady violation.
D.  Improper jury instruction.
Smith repeats the argument he made in his post-trial motions that the interstate
portion of the felon-in-possession jury charge was improper.  Because Smith did not
object to the instruction, it is reviewed for plain error.  United States v. Antico, 272 F.3d
245, 265 (3d Cir. 2001).
The challenged jury instruction was as follows:
Finally, as to the third element, you must find that the firearm traveled in
interstate commerce.  Commerce means trade, traffic or communication
between or among the several states.  The government does not have to
prove that the defendant himself carried it across state lines.  In this regard,
there has been evidence that the firearm in question was manufactured in a
state other than Pennsylvania.  You are permitted to infer from this fact that
the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.  However, you are not required
to do so.
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Smith argues that the use of “must” in the first sentence demands that the jurors accept
the fact that the firearm previously moved in interstate commerce.  We disagree.  “Must”
simply emphasizes to the jury that the government must prove that the firearm traveled in
interstate commerce.  Smith also contends that the jury likely misunderstood the
instruction concerning the use of the word “fact” and thought it meant that it should
accept the government’s theory of interstate movement of the gun.   Again we disagree. 
“Fact” means only that the jury could infer that the firearm had moved in interstate
commerce if it credited the testimony that the firearm had been manufactured outside of
Pennsylvania.
E. Due process violation.
Smith’s last argument is that the “felon element” of § 922(g) violates his due
process rights.  Smith contends that because he is entitled to the presumption of
innocence as to every element of the offense, the introduction of the fact that he was a
convicted felon does not comport with due process.  He claims that allowing the jurors to
know he was a felon resulted in unfair prejudice.  However, a due process violation does
not necessarily follow.  See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189-192 (1997). 
Moreover, careful voir dire can help insure that jurors who would be influenced by
knowledge of the element of a prior felony conviction are not chosen for the jury. There
is no allegation that any juror who was seated here indicated that he/she would be unable
to afford Smith the presumption of innocense because of a prior felony conviction.
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Accordingly, we also conclude this argument is meritless.
IV.
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and
sentence.
